5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, NebraskaTHE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958A friend who runs a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote: "The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘exuberant’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least".一位掌管中型投资信托的朋友最近写道：“美国人的善变个性造就了1958年市场风格的巨大转变，至少“兴奋”这个词可算得上对股市最贴切的描述。I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year almost any reason has been seized upon to justify “Investing” in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices, I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it.我认为这总结了1958年市场主导心理的变化，业余投资人和专业投资人皆然。过去一年，几乎任何理由都可以用来证明“投资”的合理性。毫无疑问，现在股市中情绪波动较大者的数量比过去很多年都多，这些人还能留在股市多久取决于他们认为还能快速轻松获利多久。虽然不可能确定这类人的人数增长和由此刺激的股价上涨会持续多久，但我相信，他们停留的时间越长，市场的反应就会越大。I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profits from investment in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.我不会尝试预测整体市场—而是努力专注于寻找被低估的证券。然而，我确实相信，公众普遍相信投资股票必然会获利的想法最终将导致大麻烦。如果这种情况发生，证券价格会大跌，即使是那些被低估的证券都不能幸免，但我认为证券的内在价值并不会受此影响。【再一次，巴菲特判断市场参与主体的情绪、观点，但并不预测市场。关注点是在寻找被低估的证券】In my letter of last year, I wrote: “Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively will. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.”在上一年的股东信中，我写道“相对而言，我们在熊市中的表现可能会优于牛市，因此从上述结果中得出的结论应考虑到这一点，即这是一个我们应该表现相对较好的年份。而在整体市场显著上涨的年份，我对能够与市场平均上涨水平保持一致感到非常满意。”The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones Industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that a substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.“后一句话描述了我们在1958年这类上涨行情中的表现情况，我的预测也得到了验证。道琼斯工业平均指数从435点上涨到583点，加回约20点股息后，总体增幅为38.5%。我们整年运营的五个合伙企业，取得了略好于上面38.5%的平均成果。根据这两年末的市场价值计算，它们的增幅在36.7%到46.2%之间。考虑到相当一部分资产一直投资于在快速上涨市场中收益甚微的证券，我认为这样的成果相当不错。我将继续预测，在下跌或平稳的市场中，我们的结果将高于平均水平；但在上涨市场中，我们只能保持跟住市场步伐。”So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.为了让你们更好地了解我们的运作方式，我想最好回顾一下1958年的一项具体投资活动。去年我提到占我们各合伙企业资产10%-20% 的最大持股。并指出如果该股票保持下跌或相对稳定对我们更有利，这样我们可以收购获得更大仓位。因此，这也可能拖累我们在牛市中的表现。This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we had a very well managed bank with substantia1 earnings power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Management was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate loss seemed minimal.这只股票是新泽西州联合市的联邦信托公司（Commonwealth Trust Co.）。在我们开始购买这支股票的时候，其内在价值按保守计算是$125/股。然而，出于一些原因，它尽管有$10/股的盈利但并未进行现金分红，这很大程度使得股价被压低到$50/股。因此，这是一家具有实质盈利能力且管理良好的银行，并且正在以大幅低于它内在价值的价格出售。管理层对我们这个新股东很友好，任何遭受最终损失的风险似乎都很小。Commonwealth was 25.5% owned by a larger bank (Commonwealth had assets of about $50 Million – about half the size of the First National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for personal reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of:- Very strong defensive characteristics;
- Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and;
- Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share.
联邦信托公司有25.5%的股份由一家较大银行持有（联邦信托有大约5000万美金的资产，接近奥马哈第一国民银行（First National）的一半），该银行多年来一直寻求合并。虽然因为个人原因未能实现合并，但有迹象表明这种情况不会无限期持续。所以，我们有以下组合：- 有证据表明这种价值最终会被释放，尽管可能需要一年或十年。如果后者成立，那么价值可能会积累到一个相当大的数字，比如$250/股。
Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposal.在一年左右的时间里，我们成功获得了该银行约12%的股份，平均价格约为$51/股。显然，保持股票价格不变对我们非常有利。我们持有的股票规模越大，价值就越大，特别是在我们成为该公司第二大股东并拥有足够投票权后，就有资格参与任何合并案的讨论。Commonwealth only had about 300 stockholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally had very little effect on the price movement of some of our holdings.联邦信托公司只有约300名股东，平均每月交易两次，因此你可以理解我为什么说股市的整体活动对我们某些持股的价格波动影响很小。【巴菲特曾说过不以频繁买卖投机的方式获利，股市不开张也没关系。此段印证所言非虚。也侧面说明市场中可交易标的的丰富程度，为践行一些观点和理念提供了必要的土壤。】Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which railed the price to about $65 where we were neither buyer nor seller. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any "Leakage" regarding our portfolio holdings.不幸的是，我们在购买时遇到了一些竞争，在我们既不是买家也不是卖家的情况下，价格被抬升到约65美元。在不活跃股票中，极小的买入订单就可以造成如此大的价格变化，这也解释了保密的重要性，不能“泄漏”投资组合的持股信息。【低流动性，天然与价格低位有一定正相关性，通常只有在股价相对较高的一段时期，交易量、持仓人数等市场交投指标才会同处高位。】Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holder at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.去年年末时，我们成功找到一个新的特殊投资机会，可以以有吸引力的价格成为目标企业的最大股东，所以尽管当时联邦信托的市场报价已经跌了约20%，我们仍然以每股80美元出售了这支股票。It is obvious that we could still be sitting with $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such at Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.显然，我们本可以继续耐心持有$50/股买入的联邦信托公司股票，并继续逐步小规模买入，尽管这会导致我们去年的表现与市场相比看起来很差，但我对此计划也会感到相当满意。很大程度上，像联邦信托这类型股票能够实现利润的年份，都是比较偶然的。因此，把任意单一年份的表现当作长期估值基础，都有严重的局限性。然而，我相信投资于这种被低估且受到良好保护的证券是实现长期利润的最可靠方式。I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with an intrinsic value $135 is quite different from a price $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.我想提的是，以$80/股买到该股票的人在未来几年内可以期待良好的回报。然而，$80/股与内在价值$135/股的相对低估，和$50/股与$125/股内在价值的相对低估是截然不同的，我认为我们的资本在投资新标的后会得到更好地运用。这个新标的比联邦信托大些，并且占各合伙企业资产的约25%。虽然这支股票的相对低估程度与我们拥有的大多数其他股票相差无几（可能还不如其中的一部分），但由于我们是最大股东，这在决定纠正低估所需时间上拥有巨大优势。在这个特定的持股中，我们几乎可以确保在持有期间的表现优于道琼斯指数。【1.价值投资并不等同于长期持有，当在持续寻找被低估股票的过程中发现更合适标的时，巴菲特从不介意果断退出、果断介入。后期伯克希尔的资产规模过大时，巴菲特很难找到类似的小规模参与机会，这也令一些人质疑、误解巴菲特的投资理念是否变了或不再适用。通过巴菲特早期投资生涯的一些决策我们看到巴菲特一直遵循着几乎相同的逻辑。这个逻辑对在不同年代、不同国家、不同市场运用价值投资都有一定适用性。2.买入股票后，巴菲特常以股东/参与经营的角度“入局”，主动确保公司管理层的健康经营，主动促使股票的内在价值最大化，主动确保股东权益得到保障。这一点对一般投资人来说很难做到，难入局、入局难抽身，有金融市场的原因也有经济制度的原因。】The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.市场价格越高，被低估的证券就越少，所以我也在寻找足够数量的有吸引力投资时遇到了一些困难。因此我更希望增加我们资产中“套利类”（work-out）的比重，但在合适条件下找到这些项目非常难。To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.因此我尽可能尝试，通过在几只被低估的证券中获得大额持股来创造自己的套利交易。这样的策略应该能实现我之前的预测—在熊市中表现优于平均水平。基于这一点，我希望能得到评判。如果您有任何问题，请随时提问。WARREN E. BUFFETT 2-11-59本年股东信，巴菲特在多处及最后一段，数次提到”熊市表现优于平均水平”的策略。常言道，投资者在牛市中是亏得最多的。获利少许就抛出，接着受市场高涨情绪影响追高，然后错误判断牛市中的回调是熊市选择割肉。以上反复数次，最后加杠杆冲入站在山顶。简单的说“别人贪婪我恐惧”，并没有太多可用的实践价值，这句话反而会沦为一些投资者在情绪波动最为剧烈时，压垮他们的最后一根稻草。所以，在搭建投资组合之初，就朝着“牛市中可以与市场略持平，但是熊市优于市场表现”的方向去设计。这样就可以保障“牛市不急，熊市不慌”。在上涨过程中，随着标的低估程度下降，资产配置中的现金和套利类比重越来越多，自然做到落袋为安。这些资金在熊市低位时就会为建仓带来更多的可能性。只要抛弃“牛市大赚一笔立刻自由”的错误预期，也就从根本上把投资者从“追涨杀跌，惮于低位建仓”的不利境地中解脱出来。换个说法，就是不以一次成功论英雄，而是以连续跨越经济周期，并在长达几十年时间里获得略超过整体市场的复利增长为王道。投资如是，经营亦如是。
～End～
